

**AFL-CIO Support for Solidarity:
Moral, Political, Financial**

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The following is a revised and edited version of a presentation given to the “Conference on the Foreign Policy of the AFL-CIO,” organized by the Institute for Social History in Belgium and held in Ghent on October 6-8, 2011. All of the presentations, which covered many of the AFL and AFL-CIO’s international activities from the 1930s onward, have been revised and prepared for publication by Palgrave Macmillan Press as American Labor’s Global Ambassadors, edited by Robert Anthony Waters, Jr. and Geert van Goethem. Eric Chenoweth is founder and co-director of the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe in Washington, D.C.

Introduction

In response to the most important worker uprising of the Twentieth Century—the rise of the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland—America’s labor movement, the AFL-CIO, carried out an unparalleled and comprehensive campaign of international solidarity and assistance that was essential to the Solidarity movement’s survival and ultimate victory of over communism. This is not a controversial thesis. Many Solidarity leaders, including Lech Walesa, have said the same thing: Without the AFL-CIO and its president, Lane Kirkland, Solidarity would not have survived martial law.¹ Others can make a similar claim on a more global scale about the ICFTU, which coordinated key help to the union. But the ICFTU’s campaign relied heavily on the AFL-CIO and certainly no other national trade union federation compares in scale to its campaign.² Even today, the AFL-CIO leadership, which otherwise shies from the federation’s previous internationalism, cites Poland as a positive example of past AFL-CIO international activity.

Yet, the full scope and meaning of the AFL-CIO’s campaign of support has been lost over the past 20 years, not just within labor ranks in the U.S. but also in Poland, where economic policies have deliberately diminished trade unions.³ There is hardly anyone in Poland’s political class today who knows the importance of the AFL-CIO’s or the ICFTU’s efforts in helping to re-establish Poland’s freedom.⁴ The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to describe the scope and diversity of the AFL-CIO’s help, the breadth that this support had within the AFL-CIO’s ranks, the extent of international cooperation, and the extent of the AFL-CIO’s political efforts to maintain international pressure on the Polish regime to re-legalize the Solidarity trade union.⁵

The Foundations of AFL-CIO Policy

The AFL-CIO campaign for Solidarity was rooted in the federation's history, principles, and its long-time support for free trade unions throughout the world, beginning from AFL founder Samuel Gompers (1886–1924). Richard Wilson, former Director of Organizing for the AFL-CIO and Director of Special Projects for Eastern Europe and the (former) Soviet Union at the Free Trade Union Institute from 1989 to 1994, has described labor's international mission as “the ideology of free trade unionism,” meaning “unions independent and free of government control, independent and free of political control, independent and free.”⁶ This mission included an absolute antipathy to communism and communist-influenced and especially Soviet-influenced or dominated trade unions, which American labor viewed as anathema to free trade unions and a tangible threat to the international labor movement.

The first two presidents of the merged AFL-CIO, George Meany (1955-79) and Lane Kirkland (1979–1995), were both clearly identified politically for their anti-communism. They made clear, however, that their international policies were based not just on a “negative” struggle against communism but also on a “positive fight for democracy” and for free trade unions.⁷ Lane Kirkland, although not differing significantly from Meany, articulated labor's foreign policy in a slightly different manner than his predecessor. Influenced by events in Poland, he constructed a universal framework around the concept of freedom of association that encompassed all of labor's interests. He explained his approach in a speech in 1982:

While rejecting isolationism, we also reject the unprincipled pursuit of something variously described as “the national interest,” or “pragmatism.” It was the arguments of “national interest” or “pragmatism” that sped Chamberlain on his flight to Munich; that bred the plot to overthrow Mossadegh in Iran for the sake of big oil; and that inspired other excesses and adventures by the best and the brightest. We argue rather for a doctrine rooted in a universal and enduring proposition—the service of the aspirations of plain working people for freedom, a better life, and a fair share in the fruits of their labor.⁸

Tom Kahn, Kirkland's assistant and later his Director of International Affairs, put it this way:

Freedom of association is, in our view, the bedrock human right on which all the others depend for their defense and protection. Without it there is no check on the power of the unelected few to wage war on the many, both within and beyond their borders.⁹

Kirkland insisted that the principle of freedom of association should not just determine *labor's* foreign policy but also *American* foreign policy; it was the Excalibur that could cut through the seemingly impenetrable rock of national interest and trade policy and of the false choice between “authoritarian” versus “totalitarian” regimes. In all his speeches on international affairs from this period on, Kirkland argued that a single standard for U.S. conduct in the world should be established based on the degree to which governments respected free trade unions.

In a video message to the First Congress of Solidarity in September 1981 (Kirkland was denied a visa to attend in person), he took “labor’s gospel” of freedom of association to an even higher level:

For all who believe in peaceful relations among states, there is no task more urgent than unlinking human rights and freedom from the question of who owns the means of production. Freedom of association, of assembly, and of expression are the indispensable means by which the people of each nation can decide for themselves which forms of social and economic organization are most appropriate to their needs, their traditions, and their aspirations. To the extent that this principle is reflected in the conduct of government, doors will open on broader avenues to peace, to normal intercourse among nations, and to a more just allocation of resources.¹⁰

This comprehensive philosophy drove the AFL-CIO’s policy towards Poland in the 1980s.

The Rise of Solidarity and the AFL-CIO Response

When workers organized scattered strikes in Poland in July 1980, there was very little notice in the Western press or by Western embassies. But the interest of the AFL-CIO’s Tom Kahn was piqued immediately. Since 1974, he had been an assistant to the president for international affairs and editor of the International Affairs Department’s *Free Trade Union News*. He had also become the AFL-CIO’s go-to man in Washington, D.C. for anti-communist causes and for getting support for worker-related and dissident groups in the Soviet bloc.¹¹

For Kahn, as well as the AFL-CIO’s European Representative, Irving Brown, these early strikes in Poland were an important signal that the workers had not given up despite three failed uprisings (in 1956, 1970, and 1976). Their contacts with Eastern Europeans had led them to the belief that the Soviet bloc, far from being stable, was a powder keg of worker discontent.¹² Kahn devoted the July issue of the *Free Trade Union News* to the strikes and the history of opposition and workers’ protests in Poland. He rushed the issue to print and increased its distribution.¹³

Lane Kirkland also sensed that a major development was occurring. When a second wave of strikes broke out, including at the Gdansk Shipyards, he did not hesitate. On August 20, he held a major press conference—before any outcome could be predicted but early enough to try to influence things positively. He pledged the AFL-CIO’s full support for the strike movement and he criticized the Carter administration for its silence in the face of a truly momentous event.¹⁴ On August 23, he telegraphed the general secretary of the International Transport Federation and Otto Kersten, general secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, to encourage participation in a boycott action against all Polish ships, already undertaken by the AFL-CIO’s International Longshoreman Association, until the Polish government accepted the workers’ demand for free trade unions. (The ITF responded positively, which proved a key external pressure on the Polish government during the crucial time of negotiations.)¹⁵

On August 31, the Polish government and 21 Interfactory Strike Committees signed the Gdansk Accords, which included a major breakthrough: Polish workers now had the right to form independent unions. On September 4, a specially convened General Board meeting of all AFL-CIO affiliates—the federation’s highest elected authority—was specially convened to approve the establishment of a Polish Workers Aid Fund with an initial contribution from the AFL-CIO of \$25,000.¹⁶ Lane Kirkland appealed to union leaders not just to contribute but also “to undertake a campaign to raise funds within your organizations.”

Prior to the action, President Carter and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie asked Kirkland not to establish the fund out of the fear that it would provoke the Soviet Union or the Polish authorities. At a press conference to announce the fund, Kirkland responded publicly to the U.S. government’s attempt at behind-the-scenes pressure:

We are not concerned about governmental policy or government discretion. That is a matter for governments. Our independent policies, positions, and practices are the essence of free trade unionism. . . . In my view, the establishment of a free trade union movement in the state of Poland—far from representing a threat to peace or a threat to the stability of the world or of Europe—ought to serve the cause of peace.¹⁷

The Solidarity movement carried out the largest and fastest trade union organizing drive in history, reaching ten million members by the end of September. By that time, the union knew it had a strong ally in the AFL-CIO that would support it in all important ways—moral, financial, and political. While there were significant messages of solidarity and pledges of support to the Polish workers from the international trade union movement, especially the ICFTU, the AFL-CIO’s immediate willingness to raise funds on Solidarity’s behalf and its rejection of the timid policy of the Carter administration was a particularly important signal.

Tom Kahn was given the assignment of coordinating the PWAFF and of coordinating the AFL-CIO’s overall campaign to support Solidarity. During Solidarity’s legal existence, between \$250,000 and \$300,000 was raised for the Fund.¹⁸ Contributions ranged from \$10,000 (from a number of affiliates) to \$1 (from a retired union worker). The campaign reached millions of trade union members through publications and fundraising events. There were approximately twenty thousand individual and bundled contributions. Many union federations organized events that yielded several hundred to several thousand dollars, while union stewards raised money at plant gates. Frontlash, the youth arm of the AFL-CIO, set up tables at all regional AFL-CIO events to sell items with the Polish union’s famous Solidarność symbol and to solicit donations. In coordination with the Young Social Democrats, it organized the Polish Workers Task Force, which had student groups at more than 100 campuses raising funds. Together, the groups earned more than \$50,000 in sales of t-shirts, buttons, and bumper stickers.¹⁹

To send assistance to Solidarity, the AFL-CIO used direct and indirect means. In all cases Solidarity’s elected officials and representatives directed where the assistance would go, often in exacting detail (types of ink, volumes of paper, types of reproduction machines, models of

cameras, etc.) conveyed in meetings with Kahn in Europe and the U.S. or through other AFL-CIO officials. At least half of the funds, \$100,000, was sent through the ICFTU (in April and July 1981), which it recently rejoined. Most of the support was given to Solidarity in the form of equipment and supplies—including a large printing press for producing Solidarity's national publications, and smaller printing machines, duplicators, telexes, cameras and other supplies for most of the regional offices. The ICFTU made specific transport arrangements in Sweden with the Swedish labor federation's support. In many regions where equipment was delivered, it was safeguarded in expectation of a crackdown.²⁰

It should be noted that at no time did the AFL-CIO or ICFTU attempt to influence the type or form of Solidarity's trade union organization, which several other writers have noted was a negative aspect of AFL-CIO policy in some other countries, especially those where there was a high degree of communist influence. The reason for the lack of interference, perhaps, lies in the inherent independence of Solidarity from any political party or government control or influence. Given the union's origins, communist influence was never an issue. Solidarity's regional structure was never questioned.

Kirkland and Kahn took an avid interest in the course of events in Poland and in strategies to help it, including through affecting U.S. policy.²¹ The AFL-CIO sought to increase pressure on the Soviet Union and the Polish regime in order to forestall a crackdown by announcing *in advance* of such an event that comprehensive sanctions would be imposed, including calling in the Polish debt, instituting a grain embargo on the Soviet Union, and imposing a trade and credit embargo with all of the Soviet bloc. In the view of the AFL-CIO's leaders, if Soviet and Polish officials did not believe strong action would be taken they would not be deterred in the least from cracking down on Solidarity. But both the Carter and Reagan Administration were not interested in a comprehensive policy and only expressed strong (but unspecified) warnings against a Soviet invasion (but not an internal crackdown) in December 1980 and again in April 1981, when a build-up of Warsaw Pact and especially Soviet forces had been detected.²²

Following those early crises, Kirkland and Kahn both concluded that the Soviet Union was not likely to intervene directly and that the troop build-ups were meant for intimidation purposes to bolster a Polish communist government crackdown. This view was based on several considerations: the drain on the Soviet Union of its invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets' weakening economic conditions, and, most importantly, the unique mass nature of the Solidarity movement. Indeed, in Kirkland's and Kahn's view, the lack of a crackdown over time held a real significance: Clearly, the Soviet and Polish regimes understood there were significant problems in organizing a crackdown on a ten million-member trade union and a national political movement encompassing the vast majority of the population (including one-third of the communist party's membership). They came to the view that not only should there be clearly articulated disincentives to a crackdown on Solidarity, but also that incentives should be offered to the Polish government not to crack down on Solidarity in an attempt to extend as long as possible its legal existence. While this view was supported by Solidarity leaders, it put them at odds with anti-communist allies in the U.S. like the neoconservatives, who believed a crackdown

was inevitable and anything given to the Polish government before a crackdown would simply provide fuel for the crackdown.²³

Kirkland and Kahn believed that Solidarity had changed the anti-communist equation of the Cold War fundamentally and institutionally and that this changed equation required a rethinking of traditional foreign policy stances. In their view, what was happening in Poland was no less than the rise of a revolutionary mass movement—with ten million trade union members and the backing of nearly the entire population—offering hope for peacefully changing the Communist system in Poland and potentially the entire Soviet bloc. The longer Solidarity was kept alive, the greater the possibility of achieving that end.²⁴ In December 1980, Tom Kahn elaborated on this view:

. . . serious American efforts should be directed not merely to frustrating Soviet expansionism but at attacking its roots in the totalitarian structure. . . . I believe our ultimate objective must be the dismantling, by non-nuclear means, of the Communist system. Others may disagree but they are then obliged to describe their own view of the end for which unborn generations are asked to sacrifice. . . . It is one thing to tell young people that the road to peace and freedom is arduous and long; it is quite another to suggest that it stretches to nowhere.²⁵

Oddly, even within the new hard-line anti-communist Reagan Administration, Kahn found surprisingly weak support for his and Kirkland's views. Indeed, despite being provided plans and a timetable for an internal crackdown by a mole in the high command of the Polish military staff, the Administration never developed any policy to try to deter such a crackdown or even to warn Solidarity activists about its timing. There was only a policy to deter a Soviet invasion, which became increasingly less likely with the growing concentration of power in the hands of General Wojciech Jaruzelski after December 1980.²⁶

In Poland, Solidarity and its leadership faced repeated public attacks, attempts at subversion, provocations and organized violence, and a constant increase of political tensions aimed at undermining worker morale in the union. Despite the AFL-CIO's and others' many efforts to strengthen Solidarity, its legal existence was ended after 16 months with the imposition of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski on the night of December 12-13, 1981.²⁷

The Imposition of Martial Law and the Underground Period

Following the imposition of martial law, the AFL-CIO never lost faith in the union and maintained, even redoubled, its efforts in support of Solidarity. Immediately, individual unions and AFL-CIO structures at the local, state, and national levels organized or participated in dozens of demonstrations around the U.S. involving hundreds of thousands of workers, politicians, and public personalities. On January 30, 1982, in response to the ICFTU's call for a day of international solidarity, demonstrations were held in more than 30 cities and featuring widely bi-partisan speakers (e.g. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Lane Kirkland appeared

together in Chicago). Affiliates gathered hundreds of thousands of signatures on petitions demanding the release of Lech Walesa and all Solidarity prisoners, which Kirkland delivered personally to the Polish embassy.²⁸

Kirkland quickly made a renewed call for donations to the Polish Workers Aid Fund to support Solidarity, reorganized in underground structures to carry out prolonged resistance to the martial law regime. An additional \$250,000 was raised among AFL-CIO affiliates and members, including through individual contributions and renewed t-shirt and button sales by Frontlash and the Polish Workers Task Force to thousands of trade unionists and students.

Kahn also encouraged affiliates and outside foundations to support the Committee in Support of Solidarity, a group established in New York on December 14 which quickly became an indispensable means for informing the American public of events in Poland, documenting human rights violations, keeping Solidarity in the public eye, and raising funds for Solidarity underground. Over the period of martial law, unions were the most steadfast supporters of the Committee, including its fund to aid political prisoners and their families.²⁹

Over time, maintaining public attention on Solidarity became harder and harder as the media lost interest. To keep the campaign in the news, the AFL-CIO would organize innovative events—in 1983, an exhibition of underground Solidarity books and publications; in 1984, a special showing of the television production of “Squaring the Circle,” playwright Tom Stoppard’s account of the rise of Solidarity, with Stoppard in attendance—in order to keep the Washington public, including major politicians (Speaker of the House Tip O’Neil, Senator Ted Kennedy, and other elected officials attended), focused on the continuing underground struggle of Solidarity and the need for undiminished support.

Starting in late 1982, the AFL-CIO began lobbying for the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an idea of the Reagan Administration whose many Democratic Party skeptics required assuaging by a trusted ally. The AFL-CIO’s lobbying convinced many lawmakers of the need for the NED, especially the crucial need to support Solidarity, providing enough votes to pass initial funding for the endowment. One of the NED’s main tasks throughout its early years was to administer a Congressional earmark for Solidarity to be given to the AFL-CIO’s Free Trade Union Institute, beginning at \$250,000 and growing to \$1 million.³⁰

Mostly, the aid was used to help the Solidarity movement reorganize and stabilize itself underground. From the total raised by the PWAF, the AFL-CIO sent \$100,000 to the ICFTU’s Solidarity fund in July 1982 at the request of the new general secretary, John Vanderveken. The first priority for the fund was to provide humanitarian aid for political prisoners and their families and for Solidarity activists underground. Later, aid also went for equipment and general financial support.³¹ As a result of the increased funds available through the NED, the AFL-CIO was able to step up its financial and material support for Solidarity underground to ensure its continuation and ongoing active resistance to martial law.

The Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarnosc was designated to represent Solidarity outside of Poland by both Lech Walesa and the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) of Solidarity, a national underground structure made up of elected Solidarity representatives of regions who had escaped arrest. Aid was determined by Solidarity's TKK and regional underground structures as communicated to the Office Abroad. In fact, the centralization of aid through the office, which coordinated all assistance with the ICFTU, posed several problems, one being that too much aid went through one channel that was intensely targeted by both Soviet and Polish security services. The Office Abroad lacked competence in the field of smuggling and it experienced a number of confiscations of transports. In one instance, a three-truck convoy was seized at the Swedish border. The conspicuous transport was immediately seized at the border and the authorities organized a spectacle for TV, filling an entire Warsaw football stadium with the contents.³²

Tom Kahn used the large confiscation episode as a spur for greater support. "If they seize one transport, we will organize another one, and another one, and another one," he said.³³ But Kahn did not ignore the several incidents of seizures. While continuing to recognize the authority of the Coordinating Office Abroad as the legitimate representative of Solidarity—an absolute requirement of free trade union protocol—the AFL-CIO also quietly opened additional channels to Solidarity, including through Miroslaw Dominczyk, the former chairman of the Kielce Region of Solidarity who had been in exile, and Irena Lasota, president of the Committee in Support of Solidarity who had been designated as the Western representative of the Mazowsze Region of Solidarity, among others. The AFL-CIO also encouraged the NED to support humanitarian aid to families of political prisoners as well as various structures and activities of what was called "independent society"—non-trade union initiatives in the fields of education, publishing, science, and culture that were part of the overall Solidarity movement.³⁴

Altogether, the AFL-CIO distributed approximately \$4 million in assistance to Solidarity and Solidarity-related structures.³⁵ Even considering the seizures and the idiosyncratically driven nature of the aid program, the large scale of this support and the multiple channels that were developed overcame such difficulties and, by all accounts, played a crucial role, together with other international trade union assistance, in helping Solidarity survive the repressive years of 1982-89 and to regain its strength and legal status in 1988-89. The aid had an important effect. As described by Wiktor Kulerski, a member of Solidarity's national and Mazowsze Regional Coordinating Commissions, the international assistance provided not just concrete material and financial support, it also provided an essential morale boost—the knowledge that "we are not alone"—to a society in deep depression from years of martial law.³⁶

International Actions

The AFL-CIO maintained a constant vigil in Washington and worked closely with the ICFTU not just in distributing aid to Solidarity but also in coordinating efforts in international fora to pressure the Polish government, especially through the International Labor Organization, and in organizing common worldwide demonstrations on significant Solidarity anniversaries, such as

August 31 and December 13.

In 1982 and 1983, Irving Brown, the long-time worker delegate for the U.S. to the International Labor Organization, worked with the ICFTU to press its complaint to the ILO, which resulted in an unprecedented Commission of Inquiry against the Polish People's Republic (PRL) for its violations of Conventions No. 87 on Freedom of Association and No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively, the cornerstone standards of the ILO. When the Polish government refused to allow the Commission of Inquiry into Poland, the Commission issued a scathing report in 1983. It was the first such successful action against a communist government within the ILO and it further isolated the regime in the international community. More importantly, the ILO's actions forced U.S. and European governments to maintain Solidarity's demand for relegalization as a principal demand for lifting sanctions.³⁷

At the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Human Rights worked with the AFL-CIO, the ICFTU, and the Committee in Support of Solidarity to present evidence of human rights abuses and to keep in place critical resolutions against the PRL, also a precedent regarding Soviet bloc countries within the human rights body.³⁸

All these efforts to assist Solidarity were brought to the attention of a large proportion of Polish society through RFE/RL (and to a lesser extent other foreign radios). The AFL-CIO was one of the RFE/RL's chief backers in the U.S. In particular, Lane Kirkland believed strongly in the importance of a communications lifeline to people in communist countries.

The AFL-CIO, the U.S. Government, and Sanctions

One of the most significant roles that the AFL-CIO played following martial law was in influencing the Reagan Administration's policy towards Poland and the Soviet Union.

As noted above, the AFL-CIO failed in getting the Carter and Reagan Administrations to adopt its policies prior to martial law—namely, offering incentives not to crack down on Solidarity and articulating clear disincentives to forestall a crackdown. When martial law was imposed, Secretary of State Haig said his Department was “caught off guard”—despite having had the plans for the crackdown delivered to the CIA by a high-placed mole. “The confusion” caused by the “sudden” imposition of martial law, he said, resulted in a surprising initial reaction by the U.S. government to encourage the “restoration of law and order” and warn “both sides to refrain from violence,” implying that Solidarity was somehow equally at fault for the mass imprisonment, beatings, and killings of union activists and ordinary Polish citizens.³⁹

With the imposition of martial law, Kirkland believed that the US government should immediately enact a wide range of punitive actions against Poland and the Soviet Union proposed by the AFL-CIO. In sharp contrast to the State Department's wait-and-see approach, he called for swift and severe sanctions in response to “the state of war” in Poland with the aim of putting maximum economic pressure on the Polish regime and the Soviet Union to end martial

law and re-legalize Solidarity.⁴⁰ The sanctions he advocated included a trade embargo against the entire Soviet bloc, suspension of aid and credit to the Soviet Union, a transportation boycott on Poland, and calling in the Polish debt (then estimated at more than \$25 billion), which in fact was already in default.⁴¹ By tradition, the AFL-CIO believed in the coercive power of economic and political isolation of a country violating basic international rights or threatening its neighbors. The AFL had supported the anti-Nazi Boycott of the 1930s and there were many other examples where the AFL, before the merger, and the AFL-CIO had advocated in favor of sanctions and international boycotts in such diverse cases as South Africa, Chile, Iran, and the Soviet Union, among others.⁴²

Kirkland's view combined moral and economic positions: namely a belief that economic sanctions were the only non-military means of influencing regimes that had become dependent on the U.S. for trade, aid, and loans. AFL-CIO leaders argued that seeking trade and other advantages with Communist dictatorships through credits and loans—the policy advocated by American businessmen and some social democratic and trade union leaders in Europe—rarely softened the behavior of dictatorships and generally allowed the regimes to purchase more and more sophisticated weapons to use against their own democratic movements. In the circumstances of martial law, Kirkland thought that not introducing severe sanctions on both the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union (as the ultimate instigator of the crackdown and guarantor of its success) was tantamount to appeasement and, worse, in effect meant actively helping the dictatorship in its repression of Solidarity. In essence, U.S. labor leaders believed it was the equivalent of funding Poland's Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Kirkland often called American capitalism “the soft-underbelly of freedom.” His favorite example of business's moral neutralism was Walter Theobald, president of Citibank, who famously remarked before martial law, “Who knows which system works best? All we ask is ‘Can they pay their bills?’” (In fact, they didn't even require that basic business practice as can be seen below.) Kirkland cited many other examples of amoralism within the business class, but he could find no example in which a business was willing to take a loss in profit in order to advance freedom.⁴³

Oddly, President Reagan was not in synch with the strong anti-communism of the AFL-CIO. His first response to martial law was to send a letter to Leonid Brezhnev asking him “to permit” a restoration of human rights in Poland, which Kirkland pointed out “was the first time an American President had accepted the premise of Soviet control over Eastern Europe.”⁴⁴ On December 18, 1981, four days after the “state of war” was launched, Reagan invited Kirkland to meet at the White House. Reagan, thinking this was an issue he and the AFL-CIO could agree on, was unprepared when Kirkland voiced strong criticism of the Administration's “unacceptably weak” policy. Kirkland lobbied for a trade blockade, a cut-off of credit to the Communist bloc (especially for grain sales to the Soviet Union), and the recall of the Polish debt. Surprisingly, President Reagan stated repeatedly that none of these actions could be taken and the possible range of his Administration's response to the crackdown was limited by the weakness of the NATO alliance.⁴⁵

On December 23, ten days after the fact, the Administration announced some, but mild, sanctions towards Poland (the most important of which was cancellation of a \$100 million agricultural credit given earlier that year, a suspension on negotiations of the debt in the Paris Club, and also a ban on air and fishing rights). On December 29, under continuing pressure from the AFL-CIO and others, the Reagan Administration announced limited trade sanctions on the Soviet Union, with further action promised if martial law were not rescinded. Only in October 1982, with the definitive act of the Polish Parliament to formally delegatize Solidarity, the Administration took one additional action by suspending Poland's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status.

Kirkland constantly dogged Reagan for his failure to impose the stronger sanctions he had promised on December 29 (and repeated on January 30, 1982 during the "Let Poland Be Poland" spectacle the administration organized). Kirkland charged that "bankers and businessmen," not anti-Communist principles or commitment to human rights, were driving US foreign policy. The banking industry had lobbied hard against calling in the Polish debt—the action that Kirkland and Kahn thought might have the most effect in pressuring the regime to restore the status quo ante. Instead, in January 1982, less than a month after the imposition of martial law, Reagan ordered that \$71 million in losses on already defaulted loans to private banks be covered by the United States, thereby absolving the Polish government from "paying its bills." In Kirkland's view, this allowed the Polish government to stay solvent. Even while suspending MFN later that year, Reagan forgave even more Polish debt in October 1982.⁴⁶

Kirkland and Kahn believed that what was happening in Poland was a clear matter for international intervention based on the regime's violation of internationally accepted human and worker rights. They argued that only by imposing outside—and serious—economic pressure on Poland and the Soviet Union in response to the imposition of martial law would there be *any* possibility for changing the repressive treatment of Solidarity. The soft sanctions policy, on the other hand, including letting the Soviet Union off the hook for its responsibility in the crackdown, would only convince the Polish and Soviet regimes that even President Reagan didn't allow anti-communism in the way of business.

Kirkland argued that an immediate "reset" in policy was in order:

If our bankers and farmers have become hostages of the Soviet bloc—the reverse of what detente was supposed to accomplish—should we not move urgently to extricate ourselves from this situation, or should we go down the road to increasing dependence?⁴⁷

One basis for the AFL-CIO's position was the understanding that Solidarity, a mass workers' movement, would be difficult to destroy, an analysis contrary to most predictions by most policy makers and observers who expected Jaruzelski's military "coup" to "restore order and stability"—that is, social submission. Some, including Secretary of State Haig, even gave a sigh of relief that Solidarity had been crushed by an internal crackdown as opposed to Soviet invasion.⁴⁸ But all information that came into the Federation's headquarters seemed to confirm the opposite, namely that the regime had failed fundamentally in eradicating the union, that

workers' allegiance to Solidarity remained strong, and that underground Solidarity structures were being formed throughout the country, often led by prominent leaders who had escaped arrest and carried out their activities clandestinely. The AFL-CIO leadership concluded from the evidence that serious sanctions might succeed.⁴⁹

The State Department argued that a softer approach would lead to better results. Joined by big business and banks, it used every hint of softening offered by Jaruzelski—including a partial release of internees in July 1982, the formal lifting of the “state of war” in July 1983 (“a meaningless gesture,” according to Solidarity’s TKK, considering the enactment into law of most of its provisions), and the cat-and-mouse game of prisoner releases, new arrests, and threats in 1984, 1985, and 1986—to argue for a relaxation of sanctions and providing additional credits to the Polish government. Kirkland strongly and loudly disagreed. Despite the thaws, he argued, stifling repression continued. For the AFL-CIO, the task ahead was to mount sufficient long-term pressure on the Polish government and mobilize as much support as possible to force Solidarity’s relegalization. Although the AFL-CIO thought the existing regime of sanctions was weak, they argued they had to be kept in place until the government released all political prisoners, relegalized Solidarity, and restored dialogue with Polish society. This had been the U.S. government’s demand when it imposed sanctions and the AFL-CIO leaders believed that the government should see them through. In this view, the more that the Jaruzelski regime (and the Soviet Union) believed the sanctions were temporary and the more additional credits appeared to be a real possibility, the less likely they were to negotiate with an unbowed Solidarity.

Kirkland was very clear in his speeches that he considered the weakening of sanctions by the Reagan Administration and some European countries to be counterproductive so long as conditions for lifting them were not met, especially relegalization of Solidarity. Kirkland believed that the idea that additional credits to the Polish regime by European governments might somehow convince the Polish government to act nicely after seven years of brutality was, at best, misguided. Kirkland and his allies successfully pressed the administration to keep some sanctions in place until (nearly) all political prisoners were released and Solidarity was relegalized. This policy was supported by underground Solidarity structures such as the Temporary Coordinating Commission and, until 1986, by Lech Walesa. During this time, Poland was allowed entry into the IMF, the Paris Club renegotiated Poland’s debt, and some minor sanctions (fishing and transportation rights) were removed, but the most important restrictions on trade and credits remained in place thanks to the ongoing external pressure by the AFL-CIO and other organizations.⁵⁰

Although the ultimate pressure that led to Solidarity’s relegalization and Polish communism’s collapse came from inside Poland—especially the outbreak of massive worker strikes in the summer of 1988—Kirkland believed that the combination of ongoing material and financial support for Solidarity with the maintenance of a basic U.S. sanctions regime that prevented Poland’s reincorporation into the international trade and credit world was an essential element in pressing the government towards the release of political prisoners, Solidarity’s relegalization, and negotiations.⁵¹

The End Game

The strikes of 1988 showed Solidarity's strength after seven years of harsh repression and led to the government's negotiation of the Roundtable Agreement in 1989 with Solidarity representatives that re-legalized the union. The Roundtable Agreement also allowed for partially contested elections. While the structures became fuzzy (candidates could run only under the formal name of "Citizens Committees of Lech Walesa," not under Solidarity's banner), the stakes were clear. The AFL-CIO quickly provided \$100,000 from its general dues for the election campaign. After pro-Solidarity candidates won all the contested seats in overwhelmingly fashion, the communist government was ultimately toppled by a Solidarity-led coalition.

Lane Kirkland expressed vindication at the AFL-CIO's policies and also pressed on to meet the tasks ahead, including getting much greater assistance to Poland than proposed by the Bush Administration and providing direct union-to-union and technical assistance to Solidarity.⁵² Following 1989, Kirkland fostered free trade unions in the newly free Eastern bloc countries and contended with doctrinaire free marketeers from imposing a new dogma on Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

The AFL-CIO's campaign to support Solidarity was a unique example of international solidarity in American and even international labor history. There was no other issue in the post-war period that united and activated union members and leaders on a similar scale. The impact of the AFL-CIO's campaign of moral, political, and financial support to Solidarity is evident from the testimony of Solidarity leaders as well as the diverse commentary on the Left and the Right of the American spectrum. At a time when "left" political opinion had a growing antipathy to the AFL-CIO's policies in Central America, the labor movement's combined campaigns in support of Solidarity and the black free trade union movement in South Africa created a counterbalance allowing for greater unity and coalescing of views. This was due in part to the AFL-CIO's action to rejoin the ICFTU after Lane Kirkland became President and the encouragement he gave affiliates to play a greater role in their trade secretariats). This effort was aided by ICFTU General Secretary John Vanderveken, who assumed office around the same time as Kirkland. Vanderveken welcomed the AFL-CIO's return to the Confederation and encouraged its full participation in ICFTU activities.

This author's view is not unbiased. While being outside the labor movement, my own organization, the Committee in Support of Solidarity, had a strong involvement in the AFL-CIO campaign and received funding from a number of AFL-CIO affiliates. However, this paper has been based on an extensive examination of original sources for the first time, as well as a reexamination of my own organization's archives, interviews, and a review of the previous and new literature that has emerged on this topic. The conclusion remains the same: the campaign to support Solidarity—financially, morally, and politically—was the most significant and effective of many notable post-war AFL-CIO achievements in its international work.

What motivated the AFL-CIO's campaign was as simple and solemn as trade union solidarity. Lane Kirkland said often, "They are our brothers and we must help them." But the motivation was also as complicated as geopolitics: The AFL-CIO leadership believed that the power of freedom of association could undermine "the totalitarian structure of the communist system itself" and that, consequently, by weakening the communist system, Solidarity was "a force for world peace." This became universally clear in 1989, but it wasn't evident to many policy makers, intellectuals, or opinion makers beforehand. In this regard, the actions of the AFL-CIO required courage, character, and great principle against an establishment committed to stability and diplomacy. The AFL-CIO's understanding, actions, and principled persistence in helping Solidarity from the very beginning should have a prominent place in the annals of Solidarity and the histories of both Poland and the United States.

The Author

Eric Chenoweth was a co-founder of the Committee in Support of Solidarity in New York in 1981 and served as its director from December 1981 to July 1987. In that capacity, he worked closely with AFL-CIO officials in most areas of its campaign to support Solidarity. He worked in the International Affairs Department of the American Federation of Teachers from 1987 to 1991 and of the AFL-CIO from 1991 to 1993. He has been co-director of the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, the successor organization of the Committee, from 1993 to present.

References

In addition to other citations and documents listed in the endnotes below, the author relied on the following references for this paper:

The Polish Revolution: Solidarity by Timothy Garton Ash (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1985)

Power and Principle by Zbigniew Brzezinski (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983)

Solidarity with Solidarity: Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981, ed. Idesbald Goddeeris, Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series (Lexington Books: Lanham, MD, 2010)

Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy by Alexander Haig (New York: MacMillan, 1984).

Countdown: The Polish Upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980 by Jakub Karpinski (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982)

Lane Kirkland: Champion of American Labor by Arch Puddington (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005)

August 1980: The Strikes in Poland (New York, Radio Free Europe, 1981)

George Meany and His Times by Archie Robinson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981)

Endnotes

1. See "Speech of Lech Walesa to the AFL-CIO 1989 Convention," *Proceedings to the 1989 Convention of the AFL-CIO*, published by the AFL-CIO, pp. 124-131. AFL-CIO: Washington, D.C., 1989. See also accounts by Solidarity leaders of the importance of AFL-CIO support in Chapter 6, "Solidarity Forever" in *Lane Kirkland: Champion of American Labor*, pp. 163-190. Similar testimonies can be found in the *Committee in Support of Solidarity Reports* and other contemporaneous publications reporting on events in Poland found in numerous university libraries and the Polish Institute for Arts and Sciences.

2. See "The ICFTU and the WCL: The International Coordination of Solidarity," by Kim Christians in *Solidarity With Solidarity: Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1982*, edited by Idesbald Goddeeris, (Harvard Cold War Book Series: 2010), pp. 101-129.

3. In fact, on June 13, 2013, the parliament approved a law eliminating the 8-hour working day, a right won in 1919 in anticipation of new International Labor Organization conventions. A proposed general strike by the Solidarity trade union to protest government policies has met with renewed calls to restrict the right to strike and freedom of association.

4. Interviews with historian Pawel Zizak, September 17, 2011 and Irena Lasota, June 6, 2011. Mr. Zizak is author of the definitive biography in Polish of Lech Walesa. He is now working on a paper on the AFL-CIO's support for Poland. Ms. Lasota is a well-known American human rights activist. She left Poland in 1971 after her imprisonment for her role in organizing the 1968 student protests. She was president of the Committee in Support of Solidarity.

5. This paper is an expansion of an earlier and shorter version presented to the "World Toward Solidarity Conference," organized by the Institute for National Remembrance, October 21-24, 2010, Wroclaw, Poland. For this paper, the author expanded his research of files at the George Meany Memorial Archives to cover this period. While based on documentary history, the paper also relies on the author's first-hand knowledge of events.

6. Richard Wilson, interview with the author, August 3, 2011.

7. The phrases are George Meany's but Kirkland used similar language. See *George Meany and His Times* by Archie Robinson (New York, Atheneum: 1972), page 137, and generally Lane Kirkland's speeches on international affairs cited below.

8. See "Toward a New Foreign Policy," AFL-CIO Publication No. 185, "Perspectives on Labor and the World" series, International Affairs Department, 1983. See Publications section and IAD archives, GMMA.

9. Testimony to the U.S. Helsinki Commission, Tom Kahn, December 28, 1981, IAD collection, GMMA (individual folder) and archives of the Committee in Support of Solidarity, Hoover Institution.

10. *Free Trade Union News*, October 1981, Publications series, AFL-CIO, GMMA. Other speeches of Kirkland's are available in the publications and press releases boxes (processed) at the GMMA.

11. Among other actions, Kahn organized the AFL-CIO's Washington, DC and New York dinners on behalf of the exiled Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1975; a cross-country tour for similarly exiled Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky in 1977; and a prominent exhibition in the AFL-CIO lobby of underground publications from Poland in 1978. As well, Kahn arranged support for free trade unions and dissident groups in the Soviet bloc and co-organized the Sakharov Hearings in Washington, D.C. with Freedom House in 1979. See "The Gallant Warrior: In Memoriam Tom Kahn" by Eric Chenoweth, *Uncaptive Minds*, No. 20, Summer 1992; "Tom Kahn and the Fight for Democracy: A Political Portrait and Personal Recollection" by Rachele Horowitz, manuscript pp. 37-39 (adapted for publication in *Demokratiya*, no. 11, Winter 2007 and found on web site of *Dissent* magazine); and generally the unprocessed files of the International Affairs Department and Tom Kahn (Box 2 of 3) at the George Meany Memorial Archives (GMMA).

12. For Brown's analysis of the region, see, e.g., Letter of July 2, 1976 to Lane Kirkland in which he describes the first statement of the Workers Defenses Committee, KOR, a group of intellectuals inspired to act to defend workers repressed during the Ursus and Radom strikes of that year. Brown praised the intellectuals' statement, "especially the part which criticizes the lack of real worker representation in Poland, rather than just the economic issues." Unprocessed archives of Tom Kahn, GMMA (Box 1).

13. *Free Trade Union News*, July 1980. Publications of the International Affairs Department, AFL-CIO. Publications Collection, George Meany Memorial Archives (GMMA).

14. AFL-CIO Press Release, August 20, 1980, Publications Series, Press Releases, GMMA. All major newspapers covered the event and clippings are available in unprocessed IAD and Kahn files.

15. Telegram from Lane Kirkland to Otto Kersten and Letter of ITF to Teddy Gleason, Unprocessed Papers, Lane Kirkland, GMMA.

16. The PWAF was undertaken before the union's formal establishment and thus doesn't include the name Solidarity. The union formally adopted its name in a meeting of all the regional delegates of strike committees on September 17 as the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity (NSSZ Solidarność). It was registered only after a major confrontation between the union and the government in late November. See *The Polish Revolution* by Timothy Garton Ash.

17. AFL-CIO Press Release, September 4, 1980, Publications Series, Press Releases, GMMA.

18. Gregory Domber, relying on International Affairs Department, records, states \$250,000 was raised by November 1981. See "Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Development: Poland 1980-1989," CDDR Working Papers, no. 88, July 2008, Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. The total combined a large number of small contributors as well as large and significant contributions from union affiliates, including several of \$10,000. Other contributions came from T-shirt, bumper sticker, and button sales carried out by the Polish Workers Task Force, a project of the youth group Frontlash and the Young Social Democrats. Kirkland, however, announced that \$250,000 had been raised by June 1981; it is likely that the fund raised additional significant monies before martial law.

19. Boxes 31-34, International Affairs Department, unprocessed collection, GMMA. A collection of folders includes all correspondence and receipts for contributions for the PWAF.

20. Letter to Otto Kersten from Lane Kirkland, July 1981, unprocessed files, Papers of Lane Kirkland, GMMA, as well as other correspondence in Kirkland's and Kahn's papers (including in processed IAD files). The safeguarding of equipment and preparations made for martial law are known through personal interviews with underground Solidarity activists.

21. Kahn especially maintained constant contact with Solidarity officials and émigrés with knowledge of events in Poland, kept American trade unionists informed of the events in Poland through the *Free Trade Union News*, coordinated activities with the ICFTU, and kept his hand on the pulse of the U.S. government. See issues of *FTUN* from January through November 1981 for ongoing policy statements (Publications section, GMMA). This section is also based on extensive conversations between the author and Tom Kahn during this period.

22. See, e.g., *U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-81*, by Douglas J. MacEachin (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2002). For the AFL-CIO's demonstrations, see February 1982 *Free Trade Union News*; Box 31, International Affairs Department, processed collection, GMMA; unprocessed archives of the Committee in Support of Solidarity (donated to the Hoover Institution). In response to the December 1980 threat, the AFL-CIO organized nationwide protests against a Soviet invasion to back Carter's threats.

23. A debate on the topic of how best to support Solidarity was organized on March 30, 1981 at the Polish Institute for Arts and Sciences by the Committee for the Free World and League for Industrial Democracy between Tom Kahn and Norman Podhoretz, editor of the neoconservatives *Commentary* magazine. The transcript is on file at the Polish Institute for Arts and Sciences and the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe. This author has argued (e.g. in "The Gallant Warrior: In Memoriam Tom Kahn," *Uncaptive Minds*, no. 20, Summer 1992) that on December 13, 1981 the debate was decided in the short-term in Mr. Podhoretz's favor, but that in the end, Mr. Kahn proved correct that a mass oppositional workers' movement would be the force that "struck at the roots of the totalitarian structure" and create the catalyst for the fall of communism. Notwithstanding the differences in this debate, neoconservatives and the AFL-CIO agreed fully that the Reagan Administration reacted weakly to martial law and argued for stronger sanctions (see below).

24. Ibid. "Debate Between Tom Kahn and Norman Podhoretz at the Polish Institute for Arts and Sciences," March 30, 1981.

25. Speech to the 1980 Convention of the Social Democrats reprinted in *Social Democrat*, December 1980. For a collection of his speeches, see Tom Kahn's archives at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. See also Social Democrats, USA archives at Duke University in North Carolina.

26. See Chapter 13, "Caught off Guard" (pp. 211-234) in *U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-81*, by Douglas J. MacEachin (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2002). MacEachin notes that the State Department and the administration generally were "unprepared for the *sudden imposition* of martial law" despite the fact that Ryszard Kuklinski, a high official in the Polish general army staff, had been informing the CIA of such plans for nearly a year. Fearing capture, Kuklinski escaped Poland in October 1981. General Jaruzelski meanwhile had combined the powers of Communist Party First Secretary, Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and chairman and vice chairman of the highest national security bodies, indicating the Soviet Union's high degree of trust in him to "end" the crisis. Jaruzelski wrote in his memoirs that, given the knowledge that Kuklinski had provided details of martial law, the fact that the U.S. did nothing was seen as tacit U.S. acceptance of an internal crackdown as a preferred outcome. MacEachin, a retired Deputy Chief for Intelligence, concludes that U.S. officials overlooked the consequences of Kuklinski's exit and many events pointing to the impending internal crackdown.

27. For accounts of the Polish crisis in the period August 1980-December 1981, and the government's increasingly provocative behavior towards Solidarity, see *Daily Reports* of the RFE/RL and *The Polish Revolution* by Timothy Garton Ash, among others.

28. Ongoing protests against martial law and in support of Solidarity are reported in the *AFL-CIO News*, *Free Trade Union News*, and in AFL-CIO press releases from December 14, 1981 to August 31, 2002 (the 2nd anniversary of the Gdansk Accords). Events were organized on anniversaries of the imposition of martial law (December 13) and of the Gdansk Accords, attended by thousands of unionists, through 1984. See Information Department and Publications Series, GMMA.

29. Office of the President, American Federation of Teachers, Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Boxes 52 and 53 (Files 52.44-45 and 53.1-4). See also AFT archives, International Affairs Department, Box 7, File 14 for its ongoing Adopt-Family campaign, et alia, and Committee in Support of Solidarity unprocessed archives (now at the Hoover Institution).

30. National Endowment for Democracy archives are at the Library of Congress. Tom Kahn and Free Trade Union Institute unprocessed files are at GMMA and IAD files.

31. The unprocessed archives of Lane Kirkland include a letter from Irving Brown to Lane Kirkland recommending that the AFL-CIO respond positively to the request of John Vanderveken for contributions to the Solidarity Fund. Kirkland and Brown both viewed the contribution as a means to solidify renewed international trade union unity following the AFL-CIO's rejoining of the ICFTU at Kirkland's initiative. There are two additional contributions to the ICFTU Solidarity Fund, one before martial law and one afterwards totaling \$150,000. Lane Kirkland, Unprocessed, Country Files: Poland 1981-88, GMMA.

32. This author was in Poland at the time, meeting with a member of the Solidarity Regional Coordinating Commission of Mazowsze. I was crestfallen as he turned on the TV news report, which clearly aimed to demonstrate the full power of the state and demoralize Solidarity activists. Showing that anything can be turned into a positive, he told me, "It doesn't matter. This shows society how much the West supports us." The author traveled to Poland as director of the Committee in Support of Solidarity.

33. Conversation with the author and Speech to International Affairs Regional Conferences in Tom Kahn, Box 1, unprocessed files, GMMA. Note: The George Meany Memorial Archives has kept an individual box marked Tom

Kahn unprocessed files that hold papers from the 1980s. In addition, the author refers to the larger collection of Tom Kahn's files, which were sent to the International Affairs Department starting in 1972, when he went to work for the AFL-CIO. These are also unprocessed. Personal collections of his speeches and writings are also deposited at the Library of Congress.

34. See the unprocessed archives of Tom Kahn (Box 1) for correspondence with the Coordinating Office as well as the unprocessed archives of the Committee in Support of Solidarity now at the Hoover Institution.

35. This figure is the usual figure cited for total support to Solidarity by the AFL-CIO (see, e.g., Domber, Puddington, Horowitz). When considering overall support for the Polish freedom movement, and the AFL-CIO's efforts for a broad range of underground initiatives, this figure is understated.

36. See interview with Wiktor Kulerski in *Committee in Support of Solidarity Reports*, no. 50, 1988, as well as previous interviews with and articles by Kulerski in the same publication.

37. *Free Trade Union News*, August 1982, August 1983, and August 1984 ("Victory for Free Labor at the ILO" by Eugenia Kemble), Publication Series GMMA; ILO press releases, July 1983 (including an exchange of letters between the Polish Government and Francois Blanchard); and op. cit. *Solidarity with Solidarity*, section on ICFTU.

38. CSS archives.

39. Op. Cit., Douglas MacEachin, *U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-81*.

40. Formally, Jaruzelski invoked a constitutional provision for emergency measures in the event the state was being attacked by an external agent, *stan wojeny* in Polish, or literally "state of war." Of course, in this instance, the Polish population was the "external danger" against whom war was waged. This phrase has been rendered as martial law in most contemporary and historical accounts, which fails to convey the Orwellian character of the event.

41. Statement of AFL-CIO, December 14, Publications Section, GMMA.

42. The anti-Nazi boycott was initiated by the Jewish Labor Committee formed in 1934 by among others David Dubinsky and the United Hebrew Trades. JLC delegates convinced the AFL-CIO convention to adopt the boycott more broadly. See also History of the Jewish Labor Committee, Wikipedia. For other positions regarding sanctions and boycotts (South Africa starting from 1960, Chile after the Pinochet coup, among others), see Publications Section, Resolutions of the AFL-CIO Executive Council and Conventions, GMMA. See also unprocessed section of International Affairs Department.

43. See "Toward a New Foreign Policy," AFL-CIO Publication No. 185, International Affairs Department, 1983, Publications and IAD section GMMA. See also "The Widening Gap Between Words and Deeds," by Lane Kirkland, *Free Trade Union News*, March 1982, reprinted from the *Washington Post*, February 24, 1982.

44. For a description of the letter, see "Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War," thesis of Gregory F. Domber, The George Washington University, which will be expanded to book form. Kirkland's comment was made in a speech at the Waldorf-Astoria on April 3 to the Foreign Policy Association, Information and Publications Archive, GMMA.

45. Bonitati, Robert Files, Box 10, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, written notes of meeting between Ronald Reagan and Lane Kirkland, December 18, 1981. See also Diary of Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library web site, entry for December 21, 1981, where different sentiments are expressed.

46. "The Widening Gap Between Words and Deeds," Lane Kirkland, *Free Trade Union News*, March 1982, reprinted from the *Washington Post*, op-ed column, February 24, 1982.

47. Op. Cit., "The Widening Gap Between Words and Deeds," by Lane Kirkland February 24, 1982.

48. Op. cit. *U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-81*, by Douglas J. MacEachin.

49. See the series of speeches on Poland and freedom of association, especially from 1982, in the unprocessed Kirkland and IAD collections and the processed Publications section, GMMA.

50. See unprocessed Kirkland collection (country files: Poland) and IAD collection (especially files of Tom Kahn, Poland folders) GMMA.

51. Testimony of Lane Kirkland to the U.S. Congress, October 1989.