Contents:
1. Georgia: A STATE OF CRIMINALS
by Zurab Tchiaberashvili
2. Russia/Chechnya:
RUSSIAN MEDIA'S DECEPTIVE ILLUSION OF PEACE IN
CHECHNYA
3. Albania: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL COMPROMISE
by Slobodan Rackovic
_______________________________________________________
Georgia: A STATE OF CRIMINALS
by Zurab Tchiaberashvili
Three grim criminal cases
publicized on the same day in June have renewed debates about Georgia’s
image: the stealing of heavy artillery from the Vaziani military airbase
just a few days before the beginning of NATO military exercises there on
June 17; the kidnapping of Peter Shaw, British businessman in Tbilisi on
June 18; and the arrest of Simon Mchedlidze, an officer of the Ministry
of State Security, 10 miles from Tbilisi. Seemingly unconnected, these
cases all suggest that the country continues to face problems with rule
of law and public order.
Peter Shaw, Executive
Director of Agro-Business Bank, was stopped at 8:00 p.m. on June 18 as
he was driving in the center of the city. Three unknown people, dressed
in police uniforms, blocked his car and tried to seize him. Simultaneously,
another police car with three legitimate policemen stopped nearby. These
officers made an effort to clarify the situation, but in a moment another
car with four more offenders dressed in military uniforms and armed with
machine guns pulled up and in a flash of gunfire took the British businessman
away in their own car. The three real policemen were unable to resist.
Peter Shaw planned to leave
the next day after spending six years in Georgia. His luggage had already
been sent to Britain. Initially he came as the head of the Partnership
Fund, founded under the TACIS program to coordinate investments in Georgia
in the agrarian sector. Later, Shaw moved to Agro-Business Bank, a joint
project of the EU and the Georgian government.
Shaw's kidnapping
is the third case where a foreign businessman has been taken hostage. Two
Spanish businessmen, Antonio Tremino and Francisco Rodriguez, were freed
in the autumn last year after being in the hands of bandits in the Pankisi
Gorge for more than a year. Their families paid a half million U.S. dollars
to free them. Also, Sharbel Bashar Anu, a Lebanese businessman, was kidnapped
for six months last year.
On the same day Shaw
was snatched, the road police patrol stopped a jeep full of arms, ammunition,
and narcotics in Natakhtari. According to military experts, the value of
the arms alone was about a half million US dollars. The jeep, driven by
Simon Mchedlidze, a security police officer, was going from South Ossetia,
a breakaway region of Georgia, to Tbilisi and supposedly having a final
destination in the Pankisi Gorge. Mchedlidze was accompanied by Artur Ludkov,
a Russian citizen who had come to Georgia two days earlier.
The involvement of
Georgian law-enforcement officials in the illegal arms and narcotics trade
came as no surprise to Georgian society. Three months ago, “60 Minutes,”
an investigative program at the independent “Ristavi-2” TV-channel, revealed
an analogous smuggling operation, but authorities did nothing to arrest
the Georgian military officers accused of involvement in the arms trade.
The Natakhtari case has
two additional elements: the owner of the jeep is Shakro Kalashov, a so
called “criminal element,” having connections with other criminal groups
not only in Georgia but almost everywhere in the post-Soviet region. At
the same time, when the news about Natakhtari case was announced by the
media, David Shengelia, leader of Georgian partisans fighting to recapture
the breakaway region of Abkhazia, declared that the arms confiscated near
Natakhtari were intended for them. According to Shengelia, the arms were
to be later taken to Abkhazia. Whatever their destination, the Georgian
army does not have these kind of arms in arsenal.
The Natakhtari case
makes it clear that law enforcement agencies, Georgian partisans in Abkhazia,
and criminals, are working together and justifying their unlawful activities
by playing on the patriotic feelings of Georgian society.
The Natakhtari case
became the vortex of animosity between the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the Prosecutor's Office (Military Prosecutor Ghia Jikia, who publicly
accused the police of beating Artur Ludkov in a pre-detention cell). Such
disputes are another indication that Georgian law enforcement agencies
are facing a serious crisis. It is interesting that out of twenty investigations
begun since January 2002 on criminal cases against foreigners, only three
resulted in charges and none of these has gone to court.
President Eduard Shevardnadze
feels that such facts are very harmful not only for the country's image
but also for his personal reputation. Last week George Soros made an open
statement that the government of Georgia is doing nothing in the fight
against corruption. Soros has spent, in agreement with the Georgian government
and with President Shevardnadze personally, a lot of money on the initiation
of anti-corruption programs in the country with abysmal results.
Shevardnadze's image
was partly restored with the launching by the U.S. government of a $64
million program to train and equip the Georgian military to fight against
terrorism. The President of Georgia openly confessed the inability of the
country to restore public order in the Pankisi Gorge, which borders Chechnya
and harbors various criminals, stimulating the U.S. to act.
To defend himself
from accusations appearing in the Western media after Shaw's kidnapping,
Shevardnadze has blamed his ministries for doing nothing. Then he declared
that the rockets confiscated in Natakhtari are capable of destroying any
armored vehicle, indirectly hinting that he might be the target of a terrorist
attack himself. Shevardnadze continues to claim that the country is full
of enemies who obstruct his struggle against corruption. The hope that
the Georgian law enforcement agencies will be able to restore public order
in various parts of the country after the program of American military
assistance has been dashed. It is clear that without serious changes in
the Georgian government itself, any assistance will be meaningless. It
makes no sense to start any operation either in the Pankisi Gorge or elsewhere
in Georgia while Tbilisi itself is run by criminals.
Russia/Chechnya:
RUSSIAN MEDIA'S DECEPTIVE ILLUSION OF PEACE IN CHECHNYA
Dispatches from Chechnya No. 26 *
Notwithstanding all
the deceptive coverage on Russian mainstream television, the war in Chechnya
is not over.
Looking only at Russian
broadcasting services, one might conclude that peace in Chechnya has been
restored and reconstruction work is under way. Both national and local
TV channels air reports about the stabilization of the situation, the return
of weapons by terrorists, and the large-scale reconstruction of Grozny.
The head of the Chechen
Administration asserts that much progress has been made in restoring peace
and order. In fact, the situation on the ground is constantly deteriorating.
At one point, there
were rumors that presidential and parliamentary elections would be held
in the republic soon. But Russian state officials directly responsible
for the internal affairs of Chechnya vehemently denied the rumors and announced
that elections in Chechnya would not be planned even for at least a year
or two. There is, however, a possibility that municipal elections will
be held; this question is not yet finalized.
Indeed, the conditions
for free and fair elections are non-existent in the Chechen Republic: not
only does half the population currently reside outside Chechnya, but also
a horrendous war is still being waged on its territory.
Military actions in
Chechnya still continue, despite all the optimistic announcements of Russia's
military leadership that the war is over. Clashes between Chechen fighters
and federal troops take place in a number of different regions of Chechnya.
Hardly a day passes by without Russian planes and helicopters roaring over
the republic's territory. The mountainous regions are frequently subject
to rocket and bomber attacks. In addition, Russian soldiers and militiamen
are often victims of mines planted throughout Grozny. When the night falls
upon the city, firing does not stop. From 3 a.m. on, artillery cannonade
wakes up Grozny while Russian soldiers shoot at the abandoned lots of land
on the outskirts of the city as well the mountainous regions.
In March 2002, there
was widespread news about a significant decrease in the large number of
Russian checkpoints, which were set up by the Russian army to extract money
from travelers. Yet, the real number of the checkpoints has remained the
same. Only cosmetic changes were made by relocating the posts from the
center of the road to the side. Russian soldiers on duty continue to extract
money from drivers, finding any possible pretext for harassment or threats
of arrest and detention.
Mop-up operations
of the Russian army have become a regular occurrence in Grozny. Moreover,
they have reached heightened levels. In the past, such emergencies as an
explosion in the city or firing at Russian soldiers entailed mop-up operations.
Now they are callously carried out regardless of the circumstances.
Since early June,
mop-up operations have taken place in the Leninsky, Oktyabrsky, and Zavodsly
districts of Grozny and the Grozny rural district. According to the testimony
of witnesses from the Leninsky district, ten people were detained; many
of whom were released the next day. Another mop-up operation took the inhabitants
of the village of Proletarsky by surprise at 1 a.m. Men between the ages
of 18 and 45 were detained, beaten, and finally released.
Until recently, schools
remained untouched by the Russian army. Yet, there is a growing number
of cases where Russian soldiers have broken into school buildings, insulted
teachers, and beaten up and detained high school students. The higher educational
establishments also have become subject to systematic mop-up operations,
especially in the Leninsky district of Grozny.
The Russian armed
forces kick off the day with raids of multi-story buildings and a passport
inspection of every apartment. Suspects, mainly men between the ages of
16 and 45, are detained and brought to the police office. Among the detainees,
there are a number who are not registered, as well as some who do not reside
nearby the area of their registration.
Russian troops regularly
mastermind so-called ambushes that block the roads and target suspicious-looking
individuals, mainly men.
At night, Russian
soldiers sometimes shoot civilians walking in the streets of Grozny without
any warning. By the same token, snipers, lurking atop high buildings, are
also quite unpredictable. Life in the city remains fraught with danger.
Here is an excerpt
from an interview with a 67-year old resident of Grozny A. Aslanova:
During the previous war, I was not afraid of Russian soldiers. Now
the mere sight of them sends shivers down my spine. I do not have any clue
what to expect from them. Wherever they go, shooting and explosions are
heard. Russian soldiers are often drunk and shoot at random in all directions.
It is impossible to fall asleep at night because the shooting never stops.
The question is who is shooting and at whom. It is said that Russian army
has a mission to accomplish and plans to fire until it uses up its resources.
Gas is regularly turned off, leaving people hungry. My daily ration consists
of bread and tea. I do not know how the youngsters can survive on such
a diet.
I am tired of all that. And I have endured a lot in my life. As a small
girl, I was [exiled] to Kazakhstan, I was on the verge of starvation there
in 1944. The elderly say that it was much easier to live at that time.
I used to have an apartment, my son used to have a house. Now everything
is bombed and leveled. I have to live in a stranger's house. It seems to
me that it would be better if the Russian army would gather all of us and
kill us on the spot instead of torturing us like this. . .
R. Mutsaev, a 47-year
old teacher, spoke about life in Chechnya:
Life in Grozny reminds me of a snapshot from an old Soviet movie: whenever
the White Army comes, it beats us; whenever the Red Army comes, it beats
us. On one hand, the federal troops kill and torture us because we are
Chechens. On the other hand, the Wahhabis sow the seeds of war because
we want to maintain Chechen customs and traditions. When the war broke
out, I have to admit that I sincerely hoped that the Russian army would
bring law and order to the region. However, they turned out to be worse
bandits than the Wahhabis. There was a ray of hope that the international
community would interfere, but this hope is gone. While US troops strengthen
their position in the Republic of Georgia, the Russian army, along with
the Wahhabis, continues to destroy the Chechens as an ethnic group.
The crime rate in
Grozny is staggering despite an overbearing presence of Russian soldiers.
The city is rife with murder and theft; acts of vandalism are also committed
on a daily basis. Motley bands made up of both Russians and Chechens specialize
in armed robbery across the city.
Russian TV paints
a rosy picture of the large-scale reconstruction in Grozny. It comes as
no surprise that hardly any residential area was renovated in the course
of the past two and a half years. The prime minister of the Chechen government
claims that 90 percent of the city has electricity; in reality, this number
is a mere 10 percent.
The Committee of the
Russia's Chamber of Commerce, investigating the embezzlement of financial
assets allocated for the reconstruction of the Chechen Republic, found
numerous cases of the mismanagement of state funds by the government and
the administration of Chechnya. These findings did not translate into action.
No measures were taken to punish the guilty party. It is not surprising,
because half the funds allocated for Chechnya never leave Moscow. Thus,
not only the Russian military, but also high rank officials have an invested
interest in continuing this war. Indeed, the war in Chechnya has become
the most profitable business for the Russian army and civil servants.
The Chechens have
become convinced that Russia has neither the desire nor the capability
to revive the demolished republic. The funds that do make it to Chechnya
are divided up among local officials. Chechen high-ranking officials have
to bribe Russia's military so that they can operate in a relatively secure
environment.
Workers involved in
the city’s reconstruction projects often complain of the irregular payment
of wages. Although money for paying the wages, pensions and unemployment
allowances come regularly in the republic, its inhabitants receive the
hard-earned cash with a two- or three-month delay and often accompanied
by some “administrative” cuts.
The construction worker
S. Isaev, 32, tells his story:
I have been working on the construction site in Grozny for half a year.
We were repairing a multi-story building. We were paid for the first two
months, then all payments stopped. Now all the work is stopped as well.
We are told that there is no money to pay back the debt or continue the
construction project. How can I support a family under such conditions?
If my mother had not received a pension, we would not have survived. My
wife sells goods on the market. Russian soldiers do not allow salespeople
to have normal working conditions, they constantly raid the market and
grab whatever they see. I do not have a clue what is store for me. I live
life from day to day.”
According to various
estimations, between 250,000 and 300,000 people live in Grozny. Approximately
70 to 80 percent of the able working population are unemployed and have
no source of income.
The city still stands in
ruins. The overwhelming part of the city has no electricity or water. The
roads are in a dilapidated condition, without any prospect of prompt repair.
The frequent absence of gas is a real disaster for people.
The streets are rife with
high piles of garbage that give off poisonous fumes and an unpleasant odor.
The central market is the dirtiest location in the city; yet it is the
only place where Grozny inhabitants and residents of the neighboring villagers
can buy food. Fruit, bread, and meat are sold in the midst of gigantic
heaps of garbage swamped with stray dogs and cats. Thus, the risk of having
an epidemic runs high in the city. The sanitation services in Grozny have
been put in place. They have yet to fulfill their professional responsibilities.
The shortage of drinking
water poses another threat to the health of Grozny inhabitants. Many households
take water from the wells, which are located, on average, 500 meters away
from their houses. The water in such wells tends to contain large concentrations
of gasoline and can be mixed with sewage water. The usage of such water
for drinking purposes is detrimental to health. The availability of pure
drinking water is still a pie in the sky for the Chechens. In northern
parts of the city, water is delivered in large cisterns and people have
to stand in long lines to buy it.
The environmental
situation in Grozny leaves much to be desired. The black smog from the
oil wells covers many parts of the city, especially the northern one.
The current living
conditions in Grozny remain extremely challenging. Large-scale reconstruction
and the stabilization of life in the city hinges upon the active involvement
and financial support of Western Europe and North America. Such assistance,
in turn, is possible only with the end of the military conflict in Chechnya
and the finalization of its status and relationship with Russia.
__________________________
* Written by correspondents in Chechnya, Dispatches from Chechnya is
distributed in English by the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe
(IDEE). For more information about IDEE, its programs, and the situation
in Chechnya, visit the IDEE webpage at www.idee.org. To receive Dispatches
by email, please contact IDEE at [email protected]
• • •
Albania: The STORY OF A POLITICAL COMPROMISE
by Slobodan Rackovic
Alfred Moisiju,
a seventy-five-year-old retired army general – once a close associate of
Enver Hoxha, the late communist dictator who died in 1986 and later deputy
minister of defense and military adviser to Sali Berisha, – has become
the third president of post-communist Albania. His predecessors were Sali
Berisha (1992-1997) and Rexhep Mejdani (1997-2002).
Moisiju is a
member of the opposition Democratic Party. He was elected as president
on June 24, 2002 by the parliament, with a majority of MPs from the Socialist
Party and its coalition partner, the Social Democrat Party, voting for
him. (The ruling coalition was recently reduced because of the departure
of the Democratic Alternative, leaving it short of a two-thirds majority.)
Political analysts
in Tirana think that the election of an aged Moisiju for Albanian president
is a classic example of political compromise between the leader of the
ruling Socialist Party, Fatos Nano, and the president of the opposition
Democratic Party, Sali Berisha, the two most important political figures
in the country who had abandoned their own presidential plans due to Western
pressure. Since the new president comes from Berisha's party, it is likely
that Berisha will stop accusing the ruling socialists of stealing past
parliamentary elections for awhile.
The Socialist
Party, especially its reformist faction led by the so-called young lions,
is also pleased with the choice. Among these “lions” are one former and
a current prime minister, Pandeli Majko and Ilir Meta, both of whom are
challenging party leader Fatos Nano and did not wish Nano to succeed in
his plan to entrench his already great political power by becoming president.
Western countries,
fed up with hostilities between Berisha and Nano, exerted pressure on both
to not enter head-to-head competition and to find a quick solution for
a new head of state so that Albania could finally start reforms and a process
of stabilization after much lost time. While the West wasn’t too picky
about who the candidate should be, it is yet to be seen whether the aged
General Moisiju is up to the demanding task ahead of him as leader of the
poorest country in Europe. In fact, the office of president is only an
honorary one in Albania, so Moisiju should not bear such a difficult burden.
Besides, Albania, along with Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and Macedonia,
is under some kind of Western protection, helping to steer the Albanian
ship of state towards Europe. In the West’s view, it is high time for Albania
to take a break from brutal political struggles, including frequent assaults
and assassinations, and its frequent elections so that the government,
parliament, and president can finally turn to democratization and the stabilization
of this poor and rural country.
The primary task is
to improve the security situation because there are various groups of bandits,
especially in the northern and eastern regions, on the loose. Even buses
with foreign tourists aren’t safe from them, which is negatively affecting
tourism, the most dynamic branch of the Albanian economy. Recently, a bus
full of Kosovar tourists headed for the Albanian coast on the Adriatic
was attacked and pillaged. There was also an attempted kidnapping near
Tirana, in which the parents of an 18-year-old girl and two civilians were
killed. The number one issue is the kidnapping of people who are then sold
in Western countries, especially Italy. Prime Minister Majko himself recently
acknowledged that the illegal smuggling of narcotics, cars, and gasoline
is still the most developed part of the Albanian economy and huge unemployment
and low wages (around 60 Euros monthly) is adding to the crime rate. There
is a significant emigration of young and capable people to Western countries,
primarily Italy and Greece. Inflation is growing, and the budget is meager.
The only constant income is money sent from around the globe by hundreds
of thousands of Albanian emigrants, but this money is mostly spent on electricity,
medical supplies, and other necessities Albania either doesn’t have or
is not producing at all. Almost the entire nation has turned to street
vending, selling everything imaginable, while the once rich oil fields
are now half-empty. The standard wages of an average citizen is at its
lowest level since the fall of communism ten years ago.
This is the situation in
which the retired and aged general Alfred Moisiju has become president,
so it is no wonder few people envy him.