Issue No. 316 - April 12, 2003
Contents:
1. Azerbaijan: READY FOR CHANGES: Interview with Isa
Gambar, president of Musavat party
by Stojan Obradovic
2. Serbia and Montenegro: THE CRACKDOWN ON THE MAFIA
IS ALSO A CRACKDOWN ON OLD REGIME
by Milos Jeftovic
3. Kosovo: THE STATUS OF KOSOVO CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED
BY INTEGRATION INTO EUROPE: Interview with Ylber Hysa, president of Kosova
Action for Civic Initiatives
by Stojan Obradovic
______________________________________
Azerbaijan: READY FOR CHANGES: Interview with Isa
Gambar, President of the Musavat Party
by Stojan Obradovic
In October this year, people
of Azerbaijan are going out to vote in presidential elections. A majority
of the opposition is united in a political bloc created by the Democratic
Congress, called “Our Azerbaijan.” It will put forward a single joint candidate,
Isa Gambar, president of the strongest opposition party, Musavat. Opposition
parties expect they will be able to change the authoritarian regime established
10 years ago, in 1993, when the former communist leader of the country
and KGB general Heidar Aliyev seized power in a coup d'etat.
Isa Gambar, a 46-year old
historian, talks to NIJ about the political situation in the country before
elections and what future awaits Azerbaijan.
What is the current
political situation in Azerbaijan?
Political life is very much
influenced by upcoming presidential elections that are scheduled to be
held in October 2003. These elections are of extreme importance to Azerbaijan
because they will not only determine who will be president for the next
5 years but also Azerbaijan's political future and long-term orientation.
At this moment, one could
say there is no real dictatorship in Azerbaijan, but there is also no true
democracy. On one side are democratic forces—people, political parties,
and NGOs—that are fighting for democracy, and on the other there are those
who want to strengthen the authoritarian regime. I hope that the alliance
of democratic forces will achieve its goal. Whatever happens, many things
will be clear by the end of the year.
What are you expecting?
We have a hard road in front
of us, full of difficulties, but in the end I have no doubt that democracy
will win in Azerbaijan. People are tired of the current government and
don't want to continue as before. That is why they will change it. The
government in power now is made up of people who disinclined towards democracy.
They don't want democratic elections because they know that will remove
them from power, and they want to hold on to power at any price.
Two elements are crucial
for future political developments. The first is the readiness of the Azeri
people to face squarely the current situation and to fight for changes.
The second factor is the approach taken by the international community
towards the elections.
If the international community
gives only declarative support to democratic elections, without practical
activities and measures that might aid in ensuring that elections are free
and fair, which has so far been the case, then Azerbaijan's future will
depend on us only and the struggle will be much more difficult and serious.
If, however, the international community gives these elections all the
attention needed in today's Azerbaijan, the Azeris' readiness to bring
about change will be strengthened.
Do you expect that
current President Heidar Aliyev will run for another term?
It is hard to know what
is going on in the heads of dictators and what they are preparing. There
are several possible options for Aliyev, but whichever he chooses he will
decide at the last moment. I think, however, that he will run for another
term if he is physically capable.
Personally, I would very
much like to face him in presidential elections. Public opinion sees Aliyev
as a true exponent of communist ideology and politics. Musavat ideology
is based on the national values of Azeri people, but also on international
human values. It is important that any free and fair elections show that
the ideas and values furthered by our party are supported by the voters
and that communism cannot win. So even though many lawyers argue that Aliyev
has no right to run after two presidential terms, I would like to directly
face him in the elections [in order to present voters with such a choice].
Are you afraid that elections
can lead to internal conflicts in Azerbaijan? Could Aliyev refuse to turn
over power peacefully?
Anything can be expected
from him. But I do not think he will be able to effectively fight against
our rights and our victory.
What are the basic
objectives of your presidential program? What will you change?
My program is based on Musavat's
idea and addresses the key issues in Azerbaijan. My presidential nomination
is supported by 14 parties in a political bloc called “Our Azerbaijan”
and several more parties and political groups announced they would join
us. Our priorities are the fight against corruption, economic reforms leading
to a market economy and growth, increasing the standard of living, and
political reforms establishing the rule of law. We are preparing for all-encompassing
reforms that will make our country a true modern democratic country. Our
goal is to implement democratic reforms and adopt democratic standards
that will allow us to join the European Union in less than 10 years. Finally,
our program calls for the liberation of that part of our country, Nagorno-Karabakh,
which is occupied.
Can you be more precise
about the Musavat idea?
Musavat is an old Azeri
party. It was founded in 1911. The whole 20th century was marked in Azerbaijan
by the fight between the Musavat and communist ideas.
The Musavat idea is very
simple and is based on two basic principles—the independence of Azerbaijan
and the well being of the Azeri people. The main motto of the Musavat Party
for 90 years has been “Freedom for the people and independence for the
nation.”
The Musavat [idea] means
bringing to the Azeri people respect for human rights, rule of law, new
employment, rebuilding the middle class in Azerbaijan, a return of occupied
territories, and a fitting place of our country in the international community.
How do you intend
to liberate occupied areas?
The reforms I talked about
are comprehensive, inclusive, and will completely change Azerbaijan. We
will free our country of corruption, establish stable and prosperous economic
development, and institutionalize a solid framework for democracy. Such
a transformed Azerbaijan will have an important role in the world and will
enable us to achieve return of occupied territory.
Do you expect the international
community to aid in the return of occupied territory or will you do it
with your own forces? Can the problem of occupied territory be resolved
by talks?
What is important to us
is for the problem of occupied territory to be resolved according to international
standards. This means that the solution must be based on territorial integrity
and the respect and protection of human rights, especially minority rights.
Respecting these two basic principles we can avoid a military solution.
We favor negotiations. The problem, however, is whether the other side
is also ready for such a solution based on respect for international law.
But we cannot tolerate the loss of our territory. If the other side is
not ready to accept a lawful solution, we will consider other options.
The Caspian Sea is extremely
oil-rich. There is a vested interest of world powers in Azerbaijan. How
is that influencing your country? What are your relations with neighboring
countries regarding the oil issue?
Riches often bring with
them great problems. The oil wealth of Azerbaijan may bring the country
happiness, welfare, and prosperity, but it can also result in misfortune.
It all depends on two elements. To what extent will the oil be rationally
exploited, in accordance with its true potential, and how will superpowers
and countries involved in oil exploitation in this area treat it. We think
that the Caspian Sea should be divided into sectors in accordance with
international law. These sectors are already well known. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Russia accept them, but Turkmenistan and Iran have a different approach.
We hope they will realize that division into sectors is the best solution.
What are relations
with Russia?
Russia is our biggest neighbor
and it is only normal to have interests in this area. However, Russian
interests should be harmonized with ours and based on mutual trust in order
to achieve more successful relations. We believe that close economic ties
between our countries are natural and necessary, but also that political
relations must be based on equality and mutual respect.
Even more important, our relations must be based on taking into account the interests of the whole nation. Unfortunately, the only relevant interests until now have been those of the ruling clan of Heidar Aliyev. It has to change.
How do you see war
in Iraq?
We support the coalition
and think that the toppling of Saddam's regime is extremely important to
the region and the world in general. The collapse of that regime will put
an end to threats against neighboring countries along with the threat of
development of weapons of mass destruction. Other dictators and authoritarian
regimes can now draw their conclusions from the toppling of Saddam's regime.
The world cannot develop freely while there are such regimes.
• • •
Serbia and Montenegro: THE CRACKDOWN ON THE MAFIA IS ALSO A CRACKDOWN ON OLD REGIME
by Milos Jeftovic
The crackdown on the Serbian mafia is more and more becoming an effort to completely remove the Slobodan Milosevic's regime leftovers. The results of the ongoing investigations began to be seen immediately after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and the declaration of a state of emergency on March 12 are showing that powerful para-state institutions have been allowed to be left alone for years. That shadow organization enjoyed protection of some Serbian state institutions, with strongholds in the executive and legislative branches.
Many judges and prosecutors have been arrested along with dozens of members of secret police who analysts note helped to unravel the criminal tangle. In the period of March 12 to April 9, police arrested and questioned 8,216 persons and 2,114 remain in custody with 834 of these subject to demands for additional investigation. Action is still ongoing; the end of the state of emergency is scheduled only for the end of April. Until then, more arrests are expected.
There hasn't been such a massive police action in Europe in the past decade. Jails are full so the army came in to assist, offering military prison facilities. The first large court trials are announced for the start of autumn, with the government promising to make them public.
One of the key moments of the investigation was the discovery of who murdered former Serbian communist leader Ivan Stambolic. Like Djindjic, he was killed by members of the secret police special forces known as Red Berets. Stambolic was kidnapped on August 25, 2000 in Belgrade. According to the police investigation, he was killed the same day on Fruska Gora mountain in Voivodina, where he is also buried. Immediately, people suspected that the orders for his killing came from the top, from Slobodan Milosevic, former Serbian and Yugoslav president, and Mirjana Markovic, his politically influential wife. Stambolic belonged to a relatively liberal communist grouping that was removed in 1987 by Milosevic in order to launch his open nationalist political program, a program that led to four wars and the collapse of Yugoslavia. Stambolic remained in complete political isolation, but in 2000 some opposition politicians offered him to run against Milosevic in the Yugoslav presidential elections. After considering the idea, Stambolic was ready to accept the nomination. It is suspected that Milosevic, fearing the old political opponent, had him killed. Serbian authorities asked for special questioning of Slobodan Milosevic, who is being tried in the Hague for war crimes in Kosovo and Croatia and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He accused both the Serbian government and the Hague Tribunal of a concerted action aimed at preventing him from preparing his defense in court. At the same time, Serbian authorities issued an arrest warrant for Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic, who left for Moscow at the end of February to join her fugitive son Marko. It is uncertain for now whether Moscow will extradite them. Legal issues could delay it for some time.
In any case, disclosure of this horrid murder and the whole maze of crimes committed by members of the former regime have shaken the image of Milosevic and his supporters as “national heroes.” It seems that a growing number of people agree that Milosevic and his clique belong in the Hague after all. There is, however, an impression that Serbian authorities are two years late in doing what they should have done immediately after the collapse of Milosevic's regime, cleaning out his supporters and close associates from state institutions. Part of the public has a bitter taste, asking whether it took the assassination of a prime minister for such an action to begin.
The most influential crime syndicate, the so-called Zemun clan, earned 25 million Euros from the kidnapping trade alone, with drug money worth hundreds of millions. Much of that money was invested into real estate and parts of it were “laundered,” a subject of new and difficult investigations.
Discovering the origins of
money of many local businessmen who made an enormous fortune in a quick
time is the problem of all transition societies. It is unknown whether
the authorities can uncover illegal transactions by themselves without
the aid of the international community.
In their attempt to clean
up the situation, Serbian authorities have now made swift reforms in the
judicial system. Resignations, forced or voluntary, were submitted by heads
of judicial departments, starting with the Supreme Court and going to state
and local levels. There is a new set of criminal laws. Police custody will
be prolonged to 60 days, there will be cumulative prison terms, confiscation
of property, and prosecutors and their deputies will be imposed by executive
branch. There were even proposal to temporarily introduce death penalty.
Parts of the Serbian opposition and some diplomats point out that some
proposals are not in accordance with international norms and should be
in conformity with the Council of Europe. Diplomats express their support
for government measures in fight against crime, but also point out that
state of emergency cannot last too long. Serbian authorities discreetly
rejected objections of international NGOs like Human Rights Watch regarding
respect of rights of imprisoned persons. Similar was the situation with
media. The government says that there are no rigid limiting rules for media,
but some international journalistic organizations don't think so. Therefore
one should expect a relatively fast lifting of the state of emergency because
a new Serbian government is aware that it has to continue policy of reforms,
respecting international norms.
• • •
Kosovo: THE STATUS OF KOSOVO CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BY INTEGRATION INTO EUROPE: Interview with Ylber Hysa, president of Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives
by Stojan Obradovic
This July will mark four years since the start of the international protectorate over Kosovo under the civil administration of UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosova) following the NATO campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the withdrawal of its administration over the territory. We have asked Ylber Hysa, director of a leading Kosovar think-tank organization, to analyze the achievements of UNMIK's administration and how to resolve the future status of Kosovo.
What has been achieved so far by the international protectorate over Kosova?
If things are compared to the difficult situation in Kosovo before international protection, then things have certainly changed for the better. If we look at the goals set during establishment of Kosovo protectorate, namely its mandate set by UN resolution 1244, which included building democratic institutions and transferring authority to a Kosovar government, then what has been achieved is unsatisfactory.
Since the establishment of
an international protectorate, there have been two local elections in Kosovo
(2000 and 2002) as well as parliamentary elections held in 2001. All three
have been described by international monitors as being of the highest quality
in the region, but they had no influence in improving the building of democratic
institutions in Kosovo. There are two key reasons. One is the lack of governing
experience of the new authorities, and the other is the fact that UNMIK
has not been willing to transfer its authority to a new, elected government.
With such limits, it is
difficult to achieve a better quality of institutions. UNMIK lacked a more
positive dynamic or a long-term strategy. Unfortunately, there have been
many improvisations in trying to respond to challenges of everyday politics.
How much are political
structures or political parties in Kosovo mature and ready to accept transfer
of power and take responsibility for democratic stabilization of the province?
A key problem is the non-transference
of authority to local governments, which international administration perceived
as a weak partner. The Kosovar government is in fact a very large coalition
created by the international community.
While the international
community was resolving the status of Serbia and Montenegro, it needed
a weak government in Kosovo, one which would not create any problems. Unfortunately,
following the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic, I think
that now there are two weak actors in the region and that is not a good
situation for strategic solutions.
In such circumstances, it
is not easy to give the current Kosovar government more authority. However,
transfer of power is not made only for one government. The transfer of
authority should begin simply because it is the only way for local Kosovar
institutions to start progressing, to start functioning, and to take on
responsibility. This is the more so since UNMIK does not posses enough
quality bureaucrats to create a better political situation in Kosovo and
hasn't shown much success in administration in Kosovo, either. One should
see what Kosovar government can do, give it a chance. Nobody can learn
swimming without getting his feet wet. If the government is not functioning,
there are always new elections where things can change. And a transfer
of power is very important for improving the political scene in Kosovo.
As long as the international
administration will influence the composition of the Kosovar government,
especially in imposing large coalitions, there is no necessary political
dynamic or competition. There is neither real government nor real opposition.
Without such a dynamic, there is no quality political life and management.
How much will Kosovar
authorities be ready and able to resolve relations with the Serbian community
in Kosovo?
All political elements in
Kosovo have accepted positive discrimination as a condition to enable minorities,
primarily Serbs, to be adequately represented in power structures. Of course,
that is not enough. There is much to be done for the rights of Kosovar
Serbs to be protected. That is an issue the Kosovar government has to tackle.
There is also a problem on the Serbian side. The Serbian community in Kosovo
refuses to accept a new reality in which they are the minority and so they
do not want to look for their rights in such a context. In a similar vein,
Kosovar Albanians have now to understand that they are majority and are
responsible for the position of the Serbian minority. That is why the transfer
of authority is important—so that local structures can take up full responsibility
for what is happening.
Regarding Kosovar Serbs,
one should note that Belgrade as well as some Serbian politicians in Kosovo
have inflamed unrealistic appetites about dividing Kosovo into cantons
or about the establishment of a “Bosnian” model as a good starting position
for some future division of Kosovo. It is a solution which is unacceptable
to people in Kosovo, a dangerous game which doesn't contribute to political
stabilization of Kosovo and establishment of a more positive interethnic
atmosphere.
Such ideas about the division
of Kosovo are even more dangerous given that in many areas in the region
this criterion of ethnic division of territory could apply (Bosnia, Macedonia,
and so on) and it would not be good if this Kosovar syndrome spread or
became a new ideal because a domino effect would become a disaster. I think
that it is very important for Kosovar Serbs to accept new government institutions
and to participate and resolve their problems through them. In such a way,
they will surely profit.
What about return
of Serbian refugees to Kosovo?
There are not great results
in that issue. It is true. The issue of return is often abused both on
the Albanian and Serbian sides. There are now not conditions for the realization
of that return. An issue important to such return is resolving the internal
administrative setup, which means that it is also connected to the problem
of decentralization and transfer of authority to local power structures.
Kosovars cannot be responsible for anyone's safety if they have no authority
over the police, the court system, and the other executive organs important
for resolution of many other issues pertaining to return, ranging from
infrastructure to economy. In any case, the issue of return is difficult,
but it not exclusive to Kosovo. In Bosnia and Croatia this issue cannot
be resolved quickly.
It seems that the
most important issue in Kosovo is its future status. Do you see some realistic
solution?
Well, I think that the issue
of the final status of Kosovo is more or less a known, namely that it will
be independent in future. However, what is very important is how that independence
will be achieved. There must be new relations between Serbia and Kosovo,
with both parties emerging as winners. These new relations can only be
established within the framework of a European integration agenda with
both Serbia and Kosovo becoming part of a large European family. The Issue
of the final status of Kosovo cannot be tackled without linking it to Kosovo
being part of the European integration process. I think it is important
both for Serbia and Kosovo as well as other countries in the region to
understand that the concept of sovereignty of 20th century is today an
old one.